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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
THOMAS J. SOULES, : Case No. 20100160-CA 
Appellant is incarcerated. 
Defendant/Appellant. 
INTRODUCTION 
The State urges the Court not to reach the merits of Soules' appellate issue, 
claiming that he failed to preserve the merger issue and that the court did not plainly err. 
In this case, Soules raised the issue at his sentencing hearing sufficient to satisfy the 
requirements of preservation.1 Additionally, this Court should reject the State's plain 
error claim and address the merits of Soules' merger issue because he can establish that 
the trial court committed an obvious error that substantially harmed him. Lastly, this case 
asks this Court to follow the longstanding precedent of applying a plain language analysis 
to the statute under which Soules was charged and convicted. 
The State's response brief also addresses the perfect and imperfect self-defense 
jury instruction issues but does not raise any new matters on those issues that require a 
1
 "[F]or an issue to be sufficiently raised, even if indirectly, it must at least be raised to a 
level of consciousness such that the trial judge can consider it." State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 
358, 361 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quotations and citations omitted); see also Patterson v. 
Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ^[13, 266 P.3d 828 (stating that the "preservation requirement is 
self-imposed and is therefore one of prudence rather than jurisdiction"). 
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response. See Aple. Br. at 12-23. Therefore, Soules has limited the argument in his reply 
brief to the State's claims that the trial court did not commit plain error when it did not 
merge the aggravated robbery and felony murder convictions. See; UTAH R. APP. P. 24(c) 
("Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing 
brief."). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT MAY REVIEW THE MERGER ISSUE BECAUSE IT 
WAS BOTH PRESERVED AND THE TRIAL COURT PLAINLY 
ERRED IN NOT MERGING SOULES'AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 
AND FELONY MURDER CONVICTIONS. 
The State argues that Soules did not properly preserve the merger issue because 
"at sentencing defense counsel merely asked the court to run the sentences concurrently" 
and that "[a]sking for concurrent sentences is not the same as asking that convictions for 
two different crimes be merged." See Aple. Br. at 24-25 (citing R.741:22 ("[W]e ask that 
you run . . . the further charges concurrent to the murder conviction.")). Although the 
argument below may not have been a direct request for merger, the objectives behind the 
requests are so similar that they create a nexus that should allow one request to stand for 
the other. See State v. Parkins, 211 P.3d 262, 269-70 (Or. 2009) (finding merger issue 
was properly preserved even though defendant "appeared to conflate the issues of merger 
and of consecutive sentences" below); see also Patterson, 2011 UT 68, at ^ [20 (finding 
that even though the issue was not directly preserved below, "[r]efusing to consider 
[appellant's] statutory argument [ ] would cause us to issue an opinion in contravention of 
a duly enacted controlling statute. This we will not do"). 
2 
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Even if this Court finds the issue was not properly preserved, the merger issue 
may be reviewed under the plain error doctrine. Establishing plain error requires a 
showing that "(i) an error occurred; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial 
court; and (iii) the error is harmful." State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5,1J26, 128 P.3d 1179 
(citation omitted). Here, the governing statute did not forbid the crimes from being 
merged, and as such, it was unconstitutional for the trial court to not merge them. This 
error should have been obvious to the trial court because the issue was settled by the Utah 
Supreme Court nearly six years prior to Soules' trial. Finally, the error harmed Soules by 
unconstitutionally extending his sentence. 
a. The Trial Court Erred In Not Merging Soules' Convictions. 
Both the Utah and United States Constitutions "forbid[] successive prosecution 
and cumulative punishment for" the same offense. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 
(1977); see U.S. CONST, amend. V (no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be 
twice put in jeopardy"); UTAH CONST, art. I, § 12 ("The accused shall not...be twice put 
in jeopardy for the same offense."). "[T]he [Double Jeopardy Clause] forbids successive 
prosecution and cumulative punishment for a greater and lesser included offense." 
Brown, 432 U.S. at 169; see also State v. Smith, 2005 UT 57, f7, 122 P.3d 615; State v. 
Ross, 2007 UT 89, %34, 174 P.3d 628. 
The merger doctrine has been codified in Utah's criminal code. See UTAH CODE § 
76-1-402(3) (2011) ("A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense 
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included 
offense."); see also Ross, 2007 UT 89, at 1J34; Smith, 2005 UT 57, at f 8 ("The 
3 . 
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[statutory] prohibition on conviction for lesser-included offenses flows from the double 
jeopardy clauses of the Utah and United States Constitutions.'" (citation omitted)); State 
v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 90 (Utah 1993) (recognizing that the test for determining whether 
a conviction for two separate offenses violates constitutional protections against double 
jeopardy "is essentially the same as that in Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3)"), overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Mirquet 914 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1996). 
Here, the State contends that no merger error occurred because the issue of 
whether aggravated robbery should merge with felony murder was answered in the 
negative by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1990), 
and as such, the trial court could not have erred in allowing Soules' two convictions to 
separately stand. See Aple. Br. at 26-32. However, this argument misreads Smith and 
Ross, both of which modify McCovey's holding. 
In McCovey, the court found that aggravated robbery did not merge with felony 
murder because "the Utah State Legislature did not intend the multiple crimes of felony 
murder to be punished as a single crime, but rather, that the homicide be enhanced to 
second degree felony murder in addition to the underlying felony." McCovey, 803 P.2d at 
1239. However, the court based its decision on what it deduced was the legislature's 
intent—the legislature had not codified its intent into the plain language of the applicable 
statute. See id. (concluding that "[i]t would appear that the Utah State Legislature did not 
intend "); see also idL at 1238, 1238 n.26 (supporting its conclusion by noting that 
"[a] further purpose of the felony murder statute is to deter the use of force or weapons in 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the commission of a felony," the court cited precedent from other jurisdictions in place of 
transcripts from legislative hearings). 
The State contends that "neither Smith nor Ross overruled [this holding]," and that 
as such, McCovey should be dispositive of the matter. See Aple. Br. at 29. While the 
State is correct that neither Smith nor Ross explicitly stated that it was overruling 
McCovey, it ignores State v. Moreau, 2011 UT App 109,f 6, 255 P.3d 689, where this 
Court recognized that Smith overruled McCovey. Nonetheless, even assuming that 
McCovey was not overturned by Smith or Ross, both cases materially alter McCovey's 
holding and the effect that it has on the resolution of Soules' case. 
As recognized by Smith, McCovey's holding overrode "the plain language" of the 
applicable statute. See Smith, 2005 UT 57, at %l 1; McCovey, 803 P.2d at 1240 (Durham, 
J., dissenting). Had the legislature considered "the issue of merger in felony first degree 
murder cases, it would likely have intended to provide that the two offenses in a felony-
murder do not merge." McCovey, 803 P.2d at 1240 (Durham, J., dissenting). However, 
because the legislature "did not incorporate [that intent] into the statute," "'the court has 
no power to rewrite a statute to make it conform to an intention not expressed.'" Id. 
(quoting Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 155 P.2d 184, 185 
(Utah 1945)). Under this standard ";[w]here statutory language is plain and unambiguous, 
this Court will not look beyond to divine legislative intent. Instead, we are guided by the 
rule that a statute should be construed according to its plain language.'" Id. (quoting 
Allisen v. American Legion Post No. 134, 763 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah 1988)). Applying this 
standard, the plain language of the applicable statute "indicates that an offense Ms 
5 
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established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the 
commission of the offense charged' the defendant may not be convicted of both the 
offense and an offense so included." Id. (quoting UTAH CODE § 76-l-402(3)(a) (1978)). 
This plain-language reading makes Soules's dual sentencing unconstitutional. 
Fifteen years later, the dissenting opinion in McCovey became the majority view 
in Smith. See Smith, 2005 UT 57, at Ijl 1 ("[W]e depart from McCovey's somewhat 
nebulous focus on a statute's 'nature and purpose' and return to the core principle of 
statutory construction: 'Where statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this Court 
will not look beyond to divine legislative intent. Instead, we are guided by the rule that a 
statute should be construed according to its plain language.'" (quoting McCovey, 803 
P.2d at 1240 (Durham, J., dissenting) (internal quotations and citations omitted)); see also 
Moreau, 2011 UT App 109, at |^6 (recognizing that Smith overruled McCovey). Under 
this approach, the Smith court found that "if the legislature intends to preclude [the lesser 
included offense statute] from requiring merger in a specific instance, it must clearly 
indicate that the provision in question is intended to enhance the penalty for one type of 
offense when certain characteristics are present that independently constitute a different 
offense." Smith, 2005 UT 57, at ^11 (emphasis added). "Only when such an explicit 
indication of legislative intent is present... will we consider it appropriate to exempt that 
statute from operation of the general merger requirements." Id. This approach was 
reinforced two years later in Ross, where the court applied a plain language reading to the 
statute in question. See Ross, 2007 UT 89, at T|3 5. 
6 
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The plain language of the applicable statute under which Soules was convicted 
(UTAH CODE § 76-5-203 (2007)) is silent as to whether "the provision in question [was] 
intended to enhance the penalty for one type of offense when certain characteristics are 
present that independently constitute a different offense." See Smith, 2005 UT 57, at ^[11. 
As such, the legislature had not clearly exempted the statute "from operation of the 
general merger requirements in section 76-1-402(3)." Id. Thus, the governing statute 
does not prohibit merging the crime of felony murder with the separate offense of 
aggravated robbery and the doctrine of double jeopardy requires that the two be merged. 
See id. at f 8 ("The statutory prohibition on conviction for lesser-included offenses flows 
from the double jeopardy clause of the Utah and United States Constitutions." (quotations 
and citation omitted)).2 
In the alternative, the State appears to argue that the amended 2008 version of the 
statute should apply to Soules. See Aple. Br. at 31. The statute was amended more than 
five months after the crimes were committed to include specific language showing that 
the legislature intended for the crime of felony murder to be exempted from the merger 
requirements. See UTAH CODE § 76-5-203(5)(a) (2008) ("Any predicate offense 
described in Subsection (1) that constitutes a separate offense does not merge with the 
crime of murder." (emphasis added)). However, such an application would constitute an 
unconstitutional ex-post-facto law. See State v. Dominguez, 1999 UT App 343, ^ jl 1, 992 
P.2d 995 (finding that a sentence should be determined according to the law that was in 
As was established in appellant's opening brief, "[t]he structure of the statute under 
which Soules was charged establishes that, in this case, aggravated robbery is an included 
offense of murder and not an enhancement." See Aplt. Br. at 31-38. 
7 
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effect when the crime was committed instead of a more recently amended version of the 
statute that would increase the punishment); see also Aplt. Br. at 26-28. 
Arguing that application of the amended statute would not violate principles of ex 
post facto, the State contends that the amended statute "merely codified the current state 
of the law as interpreted by McCovey," and that it "did n o t . . . increase the punishment 
for the crime." Aple. Br. at 31. However, as discussed above, both Ross and Smith 
altered McCovev, and because the state of the law was incongruent, the amendment 
could not have "merely codify the current state of the law." Instead, the amendment 
ensured conformity with the new requirements established by Smith—that in order to 
preclude requirements of merger, a provision must "clearly indicate that [it] is intended to 
enhance the penalty for one type of offense." Smith, 2005 UT 57, at U11. 
Moreover, the amendment was a substantive change because it now allows a 
defendant convicted of murder "to be convicted of, and punished for, the separate 
[predicate] offense" UTAH CODE § 76-5-203(5), in addition to the murder, and deprives a 
defendant of defenses "'available according to [the] law at the time when the act was 
committed.'" State v. Cox, 2007 UT App 317, f 12, 169 P.3d 806 (citation omitted). Since 
the substantive amendment was enacted in 2008, after the commission of the crime, it 
constitutes an ex-post-facto law. The amendment makes the offense greater than it was 
when Soules purportedly engaged in the conduct by holding Soules criminally liable for 
not one, but two offenses. The amendment makes a defendant subject to two, consecutive 
sentences and thereby "makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its 
commission." IcL at [^12. The amendment also precludes Soules, charged with felony 
8 
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murder based on a predicate offense of aggravated robbery, from defending against 
double jeopardy violations and arguing for merger. Application of the substantive 
amendment to this case is therefore unconstitutional. See UTAH CONST, art. I, §18; UTAH 
CODE §68-3-3. 
b. This Error Should Have Been Obvious to the Trial Court. 
The "'obviousness' prong of the plain error rule has been described in various 
terms, all of which amount to saying that from a review of the record, the appellate court 
is led to the conclusion that given the circumstances, the trial court should have been 
aware that an error was being committed at the time." State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122, 
n.l 1 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted). "After examining the record, an appellate court 
must be able to say 'that it should have been obvious to a trial court that it was 
committing error.'" IdL at 122 (citations omitted). 
Here, a review of the record shows that the trial court should have known that 
Soules' convictions should have merged. First, the plain language of the applicable 
statute does not preclude merger analysis and does not expressly "indicate that [it] is 
intended to enhance the penalty for one type of offense when certain characteristics are 
present that independently constitute a different offense." Smith, 2005 UT 57, at ]f 11. 
Second, Smith was decided almost six years before the date Soules' trial began, and 
Ross, which reinforced Smith, was decided almost four years before the trial. As such, 
this was not a recent change in the law; it was a precedent that the judge should have 
been able to recognize as being at issue. 
9 
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Further, Soules flagged the issue during his sentencing hearing. At sentencing 
Soules asked that his sentences run concurrently. See R.741:22. Although this may not 
have been a direct request for merger it was sufficient to raise the issue, and it should 
have alerted the trial judge to sua sponte merge the convictions. The fact that the judge 
did not make such a realization is an obvious error. 
C. The Error of Not Merging The Convictions Was Harmful to Soules. 
To establish that an error was harmful, an appellant must show "absent the error, 
there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant." State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). Here Soules was sentenced to sixteen years to 
life for his first degree murder conviction and six years to life for his aggravated robbery 
conviction. See R.741:36-38. Had these crimes been merged, it is almost certain that 
Soules would have received a lighter sentence. As such, the trial court's error in merging 
his two crimes was harmful. 
The court's plain error prejudiced Soules because he received two indeterminate 
sentences, which may be for life, for the commission of a single crime in violation of his 
constitutional right to protection from double jeopardy. 
CONCLUSION 
Soules requests that this Court address the merits of his arguments and reverse and 
remand the case for a new trial or, alternatively, reverse the aggravated robbery 
conviction and order that Soules be sentenced to one indeterminate term of 16 years to 
life (including the weapons enhancement). 
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SUBMITTED this j O day of March, 2012. 
- 3L r . ^ " ^ 
Brittany D. Enniss 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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